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CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 
u.s. v. LA YTON: EXTENDING 
PROSECUTORIAL BOUNDARIES LIMITING 
SIXTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Lay ton, 1 the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
hearsay statements which qualified under the declarations 
against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, were admis-
sible when offered to inculpate the defendant in criminal activ-
ity.2 The court also instructed the lower court that if on remand 
there was a "reasonable inference" of the existence of a criminal 
conspiracy to which defendant and declarant were party, addi-
tional hearsay statements were to be admitted as those made in 
furtherance of that conspiracy.3 
All of the statements were held admissible notwithstanding. 
the fact that the declarant's unavailability' precluded confronta-
tion of the witness which is guaranteed by the sixth amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. Ii The court also concluded it was not an 
abuse of the trial court's discretion6 to rule on the government's 
motion seeking admission of the statements prior to the retrial7 
1. 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Wallace J.; the other panel members were Ken-
nedy and Nelson, J.J.), cert. denied, _U.S._, 104 S.Ct. 1423 (1984). 
2. [d. at 560. 
3. [d. at 557-58. 
4. The declarant, Jim Jones, killed himself as part of a mass suicide which followed 
the events outlined below. [d. at 561. 
5. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him ... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
6. The test applied in United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1976), sug-
gests the trial court should reach its decision by balancing a desire to preserve the gov-
ernment's right to appeal with the inefficiencies created by conducting a mini-trial. [d. at 
626. 
7. It is important to point out that the lower court judge heard the motion prior to 
the retrial of the defendant because he had already heard the evidence at the first trial. 
U.S. v. Layton, 549 F.Supp. 903, 908 (N.D. Cal. 1982). The trial judge was quick to cau-
113 
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of the defendant, and noted that jurisdiction to review the de-
nial of the motion was available8 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3731.9 
Defendant, Larry Layton, was indicted for conspiracy to 
murder a Congressman and other related counts10 in connection 
with the shooting death of U.S. Congressmanll Leo Ryan at the 
Jonestown religious encampment, located in the Republic of 
Guyana.12 Critical to implicating the defendant in the alleged 
conspiracy to kill Ryan1S were three sets of statements14 made 
tion that by ruling on the motion before the second trial he did not intend to encourage 
the government to routinely file and appeal pretrial evidentiary motions in criminal 
cases. [d. at 908. See also, United States v. Barletta, 644 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1981). 
8. 720 F.2d at 554 (1971). 
9. 18 U.S.C. §3731 states in pertinent part: 
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of ap-
peals from a decision ... suppressing or excluding evidence 
... not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy 
and before the verdict or finding on an indictment ... if the 
United States attorney certifies .. the appeal is not taken for 
purposes of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof 
of a fact material in the proceeding. 
The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty 
days after the decision ... has been rendered .... 
(emphasis added). 
10. Layton was charged with conspiracy to murder a Congressman, aiding and abet-
ting the murder of a Congressman, conspiracy to murder an internationally protected 
person (Richard Dwyer, the Deputy Chief of Mission for the United States in the Repub-
lic of Guyana), and aiding and abetting the attempted murder of an internationally pro-
tected person. 720 F.2d at 551. 
11. Congressman Ryan was on an official investigation into allegations that U.S. citi-
zens at the encampment were living in substandard conditions and being detained 
against their will. [d. at 551. 
12. Jonestown was located in a secluded area in the jungles of the Republic of 
Guyana and was part of a religious organization known as the People's Temple, the set-
tlement having approximately 1,200 residents. [d. at 551. 
13. Accompanied by a number of Jonestown inhabitants who had elected to defect 
from the camp, Ryan and members of his party were ambushed as they prepared to 
return to the United States. [d. at 552. The government alleged a conspiracy to murder 
Ryan had arisen prior to his arrival at Jonestown and that the defendant had feigned 
defection as part of an agreement to kill him and the defectors who had chosen to return 
with him. [d. at 554-55. 
14. The first set of statements which the government believes indicate the conspir-
acy to kill Ryan was already in existence include tape recordings of speeches made by 
Jones prior to Ryan's arrival which were broadcast over loudspeakers throughout the 
camp. They indicated that Jones was hostile and concerned about Ryan's investigation, 
urged residents not to talk to Ryan and his delegation, and intimated harm might befall 
the Congressman. [d. at 551. In another recording Jones expressed his desire to "shoot 
someone ... like him." [d. at 555. 
The second set of statements made by Jones to his attorney indicate he had knowl-
edge of the events about to take place at the airstrip and according to the court, tend to 
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by Jim Jones, the leaderlll of the People's Temple Movement, of 
which the defendant was a member.16 
The district court held that some of the statements were 
inadmissible hearsay1? and did not qualify as hearsay exceptions. 
The court excluded the other qualifying statements because it 
believed their admission would violate the defendant's constitu-
tional right to confront the witness.18 The government did not 
immediately appeal the rulings excluding the statements. How-
ever, when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on 
any of the four counts at trial,19 the government filed a separate 
pretrial motion to admit the same statements prior to the sec-
ond trial. The district court judge denied the motion20 and the 
government appealed. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Appellate Jurisdiction 
In United States u. Wilson,21 the Supreme Court stated the 
implicate Jones in those events. [d. at 560. Significantly, the statements also indicate 
that Layton was not a defector but had taken all of the weapons from the camp and was 
going to the airstrip to engage in violent acts. [d. at 558. 
The third set of statements were from another recorded broadcast known as the 
"Last Hour Tape." The speech was made before and during the mass suicide which took 
place at Jonestown. Before taking his own life, Jones indicated that one of the people 
escorting Ryan to the nearby airstrip was going to shoot the pilot. [d. at 561-62. Upon 
receiving word of the deaths at the airstrip, Jones stated in part: "The congressman's 
dead ... many of our traitors are dead ... I didn't but my people did .... I don't 
know who fired the shot, I don't know who killed the Congressman. But as far as I'm 
concerned, I killed him." [d. at 562. In addition to the remarks made by Jones to his 
attorney, these statements were offered by the government as declarations against Jones' 
penal interest. [d. at 560. 
A fourth statement made by another People's Temple member was found to be 
inadmissible by the trial court and the ruling was affirmed on appeal. [d. at 563. 
15. The court observed that Jones exerted enormous influence over the People's 
Temple members and characterized the pre-arrival speeches as "[t)he rallying cries of a 
charismatic leader to his devoted followers." [d. at 557. 
16. Defendant had been in the People's Temple security force in the United States 
and was alleged to be close to the hierarchy of the Movement. [d. at 551. 
17. 549 F.Supp. at 908. 
18. [d. at 918. 
19. [d. at 907. 
20. [d. at 922. 
21. 420 U.S. 332 (1975). In Wilson, the Government sought review of the trial 
court's decision to dismiss an indictment after a jury had returned a guilty verdict. The 
Court characterized the judges action as'a "postverdict ruling of law" which would not 
result in the retrial of the defendant, and allowed the Government to appeal the ruling. 
[d. at 352-53. 
3
Santistevan and Buchanan: Criminal Law & Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
116 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:113 
purpose of 18 U.S.C. §3731 was to remove all statutory barriers 
to government appeals and to allow them whenever the Consti-
tution would permit.11 The Court outlined the necessary require-
ments for an appeal pursuant to the statute in United States u. 
Helstoski.18 The Court stated the requisites of the statute per-
mitted an appeal if: (1) there was a district court order exclud-
ing the evidence; (2) the United States attorney filed the proper 
certification; and, (3) the appeal was taken within 30 days.24 Ad-
ditionally, the statute prohibits appeals made after a defendant 
has been placed in jeopardy, but that provisions is likely inappli-
cable where a mistrial is declared due to a hung jury.211 
The Ninth Circuit has followed Helstoski and Wilson in de-
cisions where appellate review has been in issue. For example, in 
United States u. Loud Hawk,16 the government appealed an or-
der dismissing a grand jury indictment. The indictment had 
been dismissed because delay in bringing the defendants to trial 
had resulted from the government's appeal under section 3731 of 
a suppression order.17 The court reversed, finding the delay was 
necessary to permit the meaningful exercise of appellate review 
pursuant to the statute.18 
22. ld. at 337. The fifth amendment's prohibition that "[n)o person ... shall be 
... subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... ", U.S. 
CONST. amend. V., appears to be the clearest limitation to appeals under the statute. The 
dissent in Wilson pointed to sixth amendment speedy trial concerns which might also 
prevent review under section 3731. 420 U.S. at 357. 
23. 442 U.S. 477 (1979). The Court ruled the Government was authorized to appeal 
from an order prohibiting the introduction of a legislator's past legislative acts. Id. at 487 
n.6. 
24.ld. 
25. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). The defendant was retried after a mis-
trial was declared at the first trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. The Court reiter-
ated the holding in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 (1824), that a second trial 
is permitted when it is a 'manifest necessity', the most common form arising when a jury 
is unable to reach a verdict. ld. at 672. 
26. 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1980). Defendants 
were charged with the unlawful possession of destructive devices (dynamite) and unlaw-
ful transportation of weapons between state lines. ld. at 1143. The weapons counts were 
dismissed because they were not considered to be a substantial proof of a fact material to 
the proceeding, therefore not meeting the requirements of section 3731. ld. at 1150. 
27. ld. at 1149. 
28. ld. at 1150. The court found the other provisions of the statute had also been 
satisfied since the defendants had not been placed in double jeopardy and the sup-
pressed evidence was critical in establishing a necessary element of the alleged offenses. 
ld. 
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In United States v. Hetrick,29 the court expanded the scope 
of review under the statute when it permitted the government to 
appeal a court order reducing a defendant's jail sentence. Rely-
ing on Wilson, the court rejected the notion that the government 
was restricted to the specific categories mentioned in the stat-
ute.80 Similarly, the court in United States v. Humphries,sl per-
mitted an appeal which was not within the express language of 
the statute.82 However, in United States v. Booth,88 the court 
discussed the issue of whether appellate review of a motion to 
admit evidence was available under section 3731. The court con-
cluded that the statute gives the government the right to appeal 
only the suppression or exclusion of evidence, and not its 
admission.84 
B. Statements Made in Furtherance of a Conspiracy. 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence811 gov-
erns the admission of coconspirator statements against an ac-
cused. Three requirements must be met in order for a statement 
to be admissible as that of a co-conspirator. The prosecution 
must: (1) show that the declarations were made during the 
course of the conspiracy; (2) show they were made in further-
ance of the conspiracy; and (3) present evidence of independent 
proof of the conspiracy and the connection of the declarant and 
defendant to it.8s In addition, it must be demonstrated that ad-
mission of the coconspirators' declarations are not violative of 
the confrontation clause of the Constitution.87 
29. 644 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1980). The court ordered that the defendant's sentence be 
reduced from ten to five years, and then some months later reduced the sentence to 
three years. Id. at 753-54. 
30. Id. at 755. 
31. 636 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1980) (appeal from denial of motion to determine the 
admissibility of evidence was held appropriate under the statute). 
32. Humphries argued the appeal was not properly before the court as the motion 
previously denied was one to determine the admissibility of evidence rather than its ex-
clusion. I d. at 1175. The court rejected the argument, focusing on the effect of the order, 
which did not elaborate on the particulars of its scope requiring the government to seek 
clarification of the order. I d. at 1175-77. 
33. 669 F.2d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 1981) (government's challenge to admitted testi-
mony of an expert witness determined' not to be subject to review under the statute). 
34.Id. 
35. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 
36. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) states in part: "A statement is not hearsay if ... (2) (tJhe 
statement is offered against a party and is .. (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 
37. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. 
5
Santistevan and Buchanan: Criminal Law & Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
118 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:113 
In Krulewitch u. United States,38 the Supreme Court stated 
that to be admissible, hearsay statements made by one conspira-
tor and offered against another must be made in furtherance of 
the conspiracy charged. The Court refused to admit the state-
ment of a coconspirator made after her arrest because it was not 
made in furtherance of the conspiracy, rather the Court deter-
mined the statement was made for purposes of concealing the 
crime and protecting one of the participants.39 Likewise in Dut-
ton u. Euans,40 the Court stated that in federal conspiracy trials 
the hearsay exception that allows evidence of an out-of-court 
statement of one conspirator to be admitted against his fellow 
conspirator is applicable only if the statement was made in the 
course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.4! 
In United States u. Eubanks,u the Ninth Circuit followed 
the "in furtherance" requirement set forth in Krulewitch using 
somewhat different terms. The court stated that in order for a 
declaration to be admissible under the coconspirator exception 
to the hearsay rule, it must further the common objectives of the 
conspiracy.4S Similarly, in United States u. Mason," the court 
held that a statement reassuring a buyer that a drug transaction 
would occur, which was made to prevent him from withdrawing 
from the planned sale, was made in furtherance of the conspir-
acy.411 Finally, in United States u. Sears,48 the court indicated 
statements made to ensure a successful escape after a robbery 
38. 336 U.S. 440 (1949). The position of the Court is consistent with the require-
ment of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) that the statement be made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
39. 336 U.S. at 443-44. 
40. 400 U.S. 74, 83 (1970). A Georgia statute allowed for the admission of an out-of- ' 
court hearsay statement made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy; declar-
ant's statement that had it not been for defendant, "we wouldn't be in this now," was 
held admissible by the Court. 
41. ld. at 81. 
42. 591 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1979). Statements which were made instructing a 
conspirator to "clean up" in order to distribute heroin were found to have furthered the 
objectives of the conspiracy to distribute heroin. 
43. ld. at 520. The court found that one of the statements at issue in Eubanks did' 
not induce the party hearing the statement to join the conspiracy and was nothing more 
than a casual admission of CUlpability to someone the declarant had decided to trust. ld. 
See also, United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975) (nothing in statement 
indicating the declarant was seeking to induce the listener to deal with the conspirators); 
United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878 (9th Cir .. 1980) (statement "we are fixing to kill a 
Mexican" nothing more than a casual admission). 
44. 658 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1981). 
45. Id. at 1270. 
46. 663 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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was committed, could be in furtherance of a conspiracy!7 The 
court admitted into evidence a statement to dissuade an ac-
quaintance of the accused from calling the police since the state-
ment was necessary to ensure a successful escape.48 
The third requirement, that independent evidence connect-
ing the defendant and the declarant to the conspiracy must be 
established was followed by the Ninth Circuit in United States 
v. Perez.49 In Perez, the defendant had made a number of ad-
missions which were considered separate and apart from the 
coconspirator exception. There was also evidence of meetings in 
which the defendant took part to exchange cocaine and further 
evidence of the actual exchange of, and payment for, the co-
caine. llo The court stated this was sufficient to satisfy the third 
prong of the co-conspirator test and concluded the prosecution 
had established a prima facie case through the introduction of 
substantial evidence other than the contested hearsay. III This 
holding is consistent with the court's earlier holding in United 
States v. Rosales. llz 
C. Declarations Against Penal Interest 
The requirements of Rule B04(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence must be met before evidence is admissible as a decla-
ration against penal interest: (1) the declarant must be unavaila-
ble; (2) the statement must tend to subject the declarant to 
criminal liability such that a reasonable person in the declar-
47. [d. at 905. 
48. [d. Other Ninth Circuit decisions have admitted statements which set an ongo-
ing conspiracy in motion or persuade the listener to act in a fashion which.would facili-
tate its completion as being in furtherance of the conspiracy. See, United States v. 
Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1977) (statement to party to secure mixing bowls to mix 
drugs in furtherance of the conspiracy to sell drugs); United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 
1069 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978). (statement made to induce con-
tinued participation or to allay fears of a coconspirator are in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
49. 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981). 
50. [d. at 659. 
51. [d. 
52. 584 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1978) (fact that defendant had actually supplied cocaine 
with the intent that it reach the undercover buyer raises reasonable inference he actively 
participated in the conspiracy); See also, United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 
1977) (evidence independent of the proffered statements must be shown); U.S. v. Cala-
way, 524 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1975) (otherwise innocent act when viewed in the context of 
the surrounding circumstances, justifies an inference of complicity). 
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ant's position would not have made the statement unless he be-
lieved it to be true, and (3) there must be corroborating circum-
stances which indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. liS 
Statements which tend to expose the declarant to criminal lia-
bility which exculpating the accused must clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement.1I4 
In Dutton v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
statement made by the declarant inculpating the accused could 
be admitted against him. The plurality opinion stated there was 
an "indicia of reliability" which warranted the admission of the 
inculpative statement.1I1I The statement in Dutton was character-
ized by the Court as not being crucial or devastating in light of 
the significant amount of additional testimony presented by the 
prosecution. lie 
Although the Ninth Circuit has applied Rule 801(b)(3) in 
cases where hearsay statements were offered to exculpate the ac-
cused,1I7 the court has never been faced with the question of its 
application where the statements were offered to inculpate the 
53. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). A provision of the rule makes it clear that there must be 
sufficient corroboration when a statement is offered to exculpate the accused. No similar 
provision for inculpative statements was included by the drafters of the Federal Rules 
and according to one commentator, the first two published drafts of Rule 804(b)(3) con-
tained a sentence which excluded inculpatory statements from the rule. 4 J. WEINSTEIN 
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1I804(b)(3)[03) at 804·110 (1984). 
54. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) specifies in relevant part: "A statement tending to ex-
pose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not ad-
missible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement." (Emphasis added). 
55. 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). The statement, that had it not been for the defendant 
(Evans) "we wouldn't be in this now," was made by a co-defendant (Williams) in re-
sponse to a question posed by a fellow prisoner (Shaw) regarding the outcome of Wil-
liams' arraignment. Williams did not testify, nor was he called as a witness. Shaw testi-
fied that Williams made the statement which was subsequently admitted against Evans. 
Id. The statement had qualified as that of a coconspirator under Georgia law. Id. at 78. 
The Court indicated it was also against Williams' penal interest to make the statement. 
Id. at 89. The concurring opinion believed the admission of the statement was harmless 
error based on the entire record. Id at 90. 
56. Id. at 89. The Dutton opinion also noted that the consideration of the trustwor-
thiness of evidenciary hearsay is interwoven with confrontation considerations. In fact, 
the Court stated that "[T)he Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evideni-
ary hearsay rule stem from the same roots." Id. at 86. 
57. See, United States v. Poland, 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 
(1981); United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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accused.&8 Other circuits however, have considered the admission 
of inculpatory statements in cases where there was sufficient cor-
roboration of those statements,69 but have often excluded them 
because of their unreliability. so The decision of the Second Cir-
cuit in United States v. White,8} permitted admission of a state-
ment against penal interest inculpating the accused but the 
court omitted most of the material which inculpated the 
defendant.82 
D. The Right to Confrontation 
The U.S. Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the 
right to confront the witness against him.8s The Supreme Court 
in Pointer v. State of Texas,s4 held that the right of an accused 
to confront the witness is a fundamental one and that cross-ex-
amination in a criminal case is included therein. The defendant 
in Pointer contested the admission of the preliminary hearing 
transcript of an unavailable witness. The Court excluded the 
testimony because the defendant was not represented at the ear-
lier hearing and therefore was unable to effectively exercise his 
58. 720 F.2d at 558-59. 
59. See, United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
60. In Alvarez, the declarant's inculpatory statement was testified to by a third per-
son and was found to be unreliable because it was made to a detective when the declar-
ant was in custody. Bailey involved a statement made by an incarcerated witness who 
plea bargained in exchange for testimony inculpating his co-defendant. He later opted 
not to testify and the court refused to admit the statements, finding them unreliable. 
Other court decisions considering the issue have involved a testifying witness who was 
unable to recall prior inculpatory statements at trial. United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 
123 (3rd Cir. 1981); United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 477 
U.S. 926 (1980). See also, United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1981) (state-
ment of unlocatable witness not admissible because corroborative circumstances did not 
indicate the statement was trustworthy); United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 
1979) (statement of unavailable witness made to an F.B.I. agent was not sufficiently 
reliable). 
61. 553 F.2d 310 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977). The court ruled the 
inculpative statements of a young prostitute could be admitted against the defendant 
and any error in their admission was harmless. Id. at 314. 
62. Id. In its opinion the court noted the suggestion of a commentator that the 
problems with reliability and the prejudice against an accused, should almost always re-
sult in the exclusion of inculpatory hearsay offered against the defendant. Id. at 314. 
63. U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
64. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The complaining witness in Pointer was no longer in the 
jurisdiction but the testimony from the preliminary hearing was introduced over the de-
fendant's objection. The Court's focus was on the defendant's right to cross-examine the 
witness as part and parcel of fair trial considerations. Id. 
9
Santistevan and Buchanan: Criminal Law & Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
122 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:113 
right to cross-examine the witness.66 Similarly, the Court in 
Bruton v. United States,66 held the confessions of a declarant 
which inculpated the defendant could not be admitted into evi-
dence absent cross-examination of the declarant who did not 
take the stand.67 
In a plurality opinion, the Court in Dutton v. Evans,68 fo-
cused its attention on the reliability of the' testimony rather 
than confrontation of the witness, and admitted hearsay testi-
mony without cross-examination of the declarant.69 The Court 
indicated the purposes of the confrontation clause was to ad-
vance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth determin-
ing process in criminal trials.70 The plurality opinion also recog-
nized it could not be argued that the constitutional right to 
confrontation required exclusion of all hearsay testimony.71 Al-
though the evidence examined in Dutton was not considered to 
be "crucial or devastating,"72 the Court outlined four factors to 
be considered in measuring the reliability of the declarant's 
statement: (1) whether the declaration contains assertions of 
past fact which might lead the jury to give it undue weight; (2) 
whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity 
65. [d. at 403-04. The Court emphasized the defendant had not had adequate op-
portunity to cross-examine the witness and hence admission of the transcript would have 
been a clear denial of the right to confrontation. [d. 
66. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The defendant had been convicted at a joint trial and his 
co-defendant's confession had been admitted against him by the trial court with instruc-
tions to the jury that they use it in their deliberations. [d. 
67. In Bruton, a postal inspector to whom the confession was made, testified to its 
content. The Court held that the jury, although instructed no.t to consider the confession 
on the issue of guilt, would look at the incriminating nature of the confession. Since the 
co-defendant would not take the stand, there was no opportunity for cross-examination 
of the source of the confession. [d. at 126. In the cases decided prior to Dutton the Court 
was concerned with the continued vitality of sixth amendment guarantees to confront 
the witness. This is opposed to the approach in Dutton which emphasizes the reliability 
of the hearsay testimony. See also, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Ohio v. 
Roberts, 338 U.S. 56 (1980). 
68. 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). See supra note 55. Only four justices concurred in the 
Dutton opinion. 400 U.S. at 76. One of the justices concurred in the result of the case but 
not with the means by which it was achieved. [d. at 93. The dissentors argued the testi-
mony should not have been admitted absent cross-examination of the declarant and 
stated that "[a)lthough Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion concludes that there was no viola-
tion of Evans' right of confrontation, it does so in the complete absence of authority of 
reasoning to explain that result." [d. at 104-05. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. at 89. 
71. [d. at 80. 
72. [d. at 87. 
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and role of the participants in the crime; (3) whether it was pos-
sible the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection; and (4) 
whether the circumstances might indicate the declarant misrep-
resented the defendant's involvement in the crime.73 
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Adams,74 stated that 
a violation of the confrontation clause could be determined by 
considering whether the unavailability of the declarant deprived 
the jury of a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out 
of court statements. In Perez, the court stated that the confron-
tation clause analysis should proceed on an ad-hoc basis, testing 
both the necessity and the reliability of the contested testi-
mony.71i The court utilized the Dutton test to determine the reli-
ability of the statements and emphasized that finding the state-
ment admissible under the coconspirator exception to the 
hearsay rule did not automatically guarantee compliance with 
the confrontation clause.76 In its ruling the court stated that ad-
missibility under a hearsay exception did not a fortiori dissolve 
the court's obligation to review the record for constitutional 
infirmity.77 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Layton, the court was faced with two jurisdictional ques-
tions of first impression: (1) whether the district court could rule 
on a government motion to admit evidence prior to rather than 
during the retrial of a defendant; and, (2) whether appellate re-
view of the lower court's order excluding the evidence was 
73. [d. at 88-89. The facts in Dutton indicate the declarant was unwilling to testify 
against the defendant and therefore was unavailable as a witness. Under the provisions 
of Fed. R. Evid. 804(a), a witness is unavailable if: (1) exempt from testimony on the 
ground of privilege, or (2) refuses to testify despite a court order to do so, or (3) the 
witness testifies to a lack of memory, or (4) dead or physically infirmed, or (5) the propo-
nent of the testimony has been unable to procure attendance of the witness by process or 
other reasonable means. In Dutton, the declarant's testimony was testified to by a prison 
informant and the opportunity to cross-examine the informant was exercised. 400 U.S. at 
89. Also significant in the case was the fact that 20 witnesses, including an eyewitness, 
testified for the prosecution and were cross-examined by defendant's counsel. [d. at 87. 
74. 446 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971). 
75. 658 F.2d at 660. 
76. [d. at 660. See also, United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976) (even though sufficient evidence to satisfy foundational 
requirements of co-conspirator exception, separate consideration of the confrontation is-
sue is required). 
77. 658 F.2d at 660. 
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within the jurisdiction of the court. 
The bulk of the court's decision however, was dedicated to 
the review of the trial court's decision to exclude various hearsay 
statements at the retrial of the defendant. In its three part hold-
ing the court determined: (1) the trial court's decision to hear an 
evidentiary motion before trial would be reversed only if the 
court had abused its discretion; (2) appellate jurisdiction to re-
view the denial of the government's pretrial evidentiary motion 
was available by statute; and, (3) the various hearsay statements 
offered against the defendant were admissible as statements ei-
ther in furtherance of a conspiracy or as declarations against pe-
nal interest, and the statements were sufficiently reliable to cir-
cumvent constitutional concerns.78 
In analyzing the jurisdictional questions the court found the 
trial court appropriately balanced the factors which must be 
considered7s before ruling on a pretrial evidentiary motion. 
Since the government and the defense planned to use the same 
evidence at the second trial, the court found it not to be an 
abuse of discretion that the trial court ruled on the motion prior 
to the retrial of the defendant.80 Further, jurisdiction to review 
the trial court's order excluding the contested statements was 
found under 18 U.S.C. §3731. Citing Wilson,81 the court stated 
that the purpose of the statute was to permit government ap-
peals whenever the Constitution would permit.82 The court also 
found that the defendant's constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy had not been violated, because the first trial 
had ended in a hung jury and therefore the court had jurisdic-
tion to hear the appeal. 8S 
Next, the court analyzed the evidentiary questions and 
ruled that three of the four groups of contested statements84 
were admissible as hearsay exceptions. The court determined 
78. 720 F.2d at 553-55. 
79. The lower court emphasized that since the evidence had been heard at the first 
trial, little or no review would be required in rendering a decision before the second trial. 
549 F. Supp. at 907. See also supra note 6. 
80. 720 F.2d at 553. 
81. [d. at 554. 
82. [d. 
83. [d. 
84. See supra note 14. 
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the statements in the recordings made prior to Ryan's arrival 
might be admissible under the co-conspirator hearsay excep-
tion81i after consideration by the lower court on remand, and 
found the statements made by Jones to his attorney as well as 
those recorded on the "Last Hour Tape" could be admitted as 
declarations against Jones' penal interest.86 
With respect to the pre-arrival tapes, the court was in 
agreement with the district court's findings that sufficient inde-
pendent evidence was available to support a prima facie case of 
a conspiracy to kill Congressman Ryan.87 However, whether Jim 
Jones was a member of that conspiracy was a question left for 
determination on remand.88 The court nonetheless proceeded to 
analyze the statements made by Jones89 and instructed that if 
the lower court found Jones to be a member of the conspiracy on 
remand, his statements would be admissible against the defen-
dant as statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy.9o The 
court reasoned that Jones' statements were more than casual ad-
missions or narrative declarations because they were expressions 
of future criminal intent.91 
The court also noted that the broadcasts were intended to 
enlist the crowd into compliance with a plan to kill Ryan, and to 
bolster those who might have agreed to help.92 The court found 
this to be further evidence of a pre-existing plan, and that the 
speeches were made in furtherance of that plan.93 Since the trial 
court had not raised the confrontation issue with respect to 
these statements, the court found it unnecessary to raise the 
85. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
87. 720 F.2d at 554. The court noted the trial court had correctly based its ruling on 
the planned and coordinated events at the airstrip, defendant's near simultaneous gun-
fire after other Temple members fired on the Ryan party, the defendant's involvement in 
a discussion with Jim Jones before the Ryan group had left for the airstrip, the defen-
dant's feigned defection, defendant's discussion with another Temple member on the 
way to the airstrip, and the fact that defendant somehow obtained a weapon from an-
other Temple member after being searched at the airstrip. Id. at 554. 
88. Id. at 558. 
89. [d. at 557. 
90. [d. at 558. 
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matter on appea1.94 
Next, the court found Jones' statements to his attorney and 
those on the "Last Hour Tape" to be admissible as declarations 
against Jones' penal interest. Recognizing that the statements 
made by Jones to his attorney were offered to inculpate the ac-
cused, the court believed application of the penal interest excep-
tion to the hearsay rule was appropriate. Noting that other cir-
cuits had analyzed the issue, the court followed that authority.911 
The court also determined the requirements of the penal inter-
est exception to the hearsay rule as applied to exculpatory state-
ments had been met.98 However, the court did not determine 
what standard of trustworthiness should be utilized when evi-
dence is offered to inculpate a defendant and expressed no view 
as to the requisite corroboration.9? According to the court, Jones 
had no incentive to shift the blame to other Temple members 
nor to divert guilt from himself, and since he had control over 
events at the encampment, he would have known the acts of his 
followers would be attributed to him. The court also believed 
that since the statements were made by Jones to his attorney, 
there were inherent guarantees of their reliability. 
Concerning the "Last Hour Tape", the court found the 
statements to be declarations against penal interest.98 Unlike the 
statements to Jones' attorney which did not clearly indicate 
Jones' involvement, the tape amounted to an admission of crimi-
nalliability for the killings.99 However, the court disagreed with 
the trial court's conclusion that admission of these statements 
would violate the confrontation clause.loo 
The court analyzed the confrontation issue with respect to 
the "Last Hour Tape" and the statements made to Jones' attor-
94. Id. at 558. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
95. 720 F.2d at 558. 
96. Id. at 559. 
97. Id. Instead, the court stated the declarations were against Jones penal interest 
and trustworthy for the same reason; his knowledge of the events that were about to take 
place at the airstrip. Id. at 560. . 
98. Id. at 562-63. The trial court had made a similar ruling but excluded the state-
ments on confrontation grounds. 549 F.Supp. at 914. 
99.Id. 
100. 720 F.2d at 562-63. 
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ney by referring to the reliability analysis in Dutton. lOl The 
court determined admission of Jones' statements to his attorney 
would not violate the defendant's right to confront the witness 
because: (1) the remarks were reliable insofar as they indicated 
Jones' awareness of and cooperation with the events at the air-
strip, (2) they were corroborated by the killings, and (3) the 
statements were against Jones' penal interest. l02 Applying the 
two part necessity and reliability approach used in Perez, the 
court found that the necessity prong was met because Jones was 
dead, and emphasized the reliability prong was supported by the 
degree of corroboration and the fact that it was against Jones' 
penal interest to make the statement. 103 
Finally, with regard to the "Last Hour Tape", the court 
found that under Dutton, the statements were not so inherently. 
untrustworthy that they should have been excluded at the first 
trial. The court states that Jones' statements on the tapes indi-
cated he had detailed personal knowledge of the events that 
were about to occur. The court also noted that there was little 
likelihood that Jones' memory was faulty because of the close 
temporal proximity of his statements to the events. l04 Also sig-
nificant to the finding that the statements were admissible was 
the court's opinion that any dangers which might be involved in 
admitting the tape recorded statements without the opportunity 
for cross-examination would be mitigated by the jury's position 
to judge Jones' mental condition from the recordings 
themselves. 1011 
IV. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit's near methodical approach in Layton 
reaches an end not within the means of applicable law. The 
holdings may have the effect of extending prosecutorial bounda-
ries while narrowing sixth amendment protectionsl06 in criminal 
101. Id. at 561. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 562. 
105. Id. at 562-63. The trial court had excluded the evidence because it was impossi-
ble to tell what Jones meant from the tape recordings because of his agitated state of 
mind. 549 F.Supp. at 914. 
106. See, Keller, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confron-
tation Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 159 (1983); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 1185; Vaughn & Weaver, Interplay of the Confrontation Clause and the 
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cases. The court also fails to recognize the practical and legal 
implications of its decision. 
For example, while the court's holdings on the jurisdictional 
issues appear sound in light of Wilson, the court neglects to cau-
tion against routine evidentiary appeals by the government. The 
court relied on Wilson as authority to disregard the language of 
§3731 and emphasized that the right to appeal under the statute 
could be exercised provided the appeal did not conflict with the 
Constitution. The constitutional concern to not put the defen-
dant in jeopardy is recognized, but another point is overlooked. 
Permitting an immediate appeal of a government pretrial mo-
tion to admit evidence could result in the routine filing of pre-
trial motions of this sort. When it ruled on the government's 
motion prior to defendant's retrial, the lower court stated that it 
discouraged the filing and appeal of pretrial evidentiary motions 
by the government because it could cause great delay and mis-
chief in the judiciary.lo7 In complex cases such as Layton, a sec-
ond trial can be significantly delayed while an interlocutory or-
der is appealed to a higher court. As a matter of judicial 
expedience, the government should be required to comply with 
the statute by filing a timely appeal when evidence is initially 
excluded and should not be given a windfall when it files its own 
motion to admit the same evidence. lo8 
In the analysis of the conspiracy issue, the court noted that 
the district court had not clearly indicated at what point the 
conspiracy to kill Ryan came into existence}09 However, the 
court reviewed all of the statement~ made by Jones and ruled 
that if on remand the district court found there was enough evi-
dence to support a "reasonable inference" that the defendant 
and Jones were members of the same conspiracy to kill Ryan, 
the statements were to be admitted.llo 
The ruling is problematic in that the circumstances under 
which Jones made the statements are atypical of the cases relied 
Hearsay Rule, 29 ARK. L. REV. 375 (1975). 
107. 549 F.Supp. at 908. 
108. The lower court pointed out that other jurisdictions which permit interlocutory 
appeals have had difficulty securing for criminal defendants the right to speedy trial. [d. 
109. 720 F.2d at 558. 
110. [d. 
16
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on by the court in Layton. The authority cited by the court1l1 
involved fact situations where the statements were made be-
tween identifiable co-conspirators or made to identifiable third 
persons. The speeches made by Jones were not earmarked for 
the defendant, but were broadcast over loudspeakers to all of 
the Jonestown residents. If they are to be admitted at defen-
dant's retrial it must be presumed that either he heard and ac-
quiesced in what Jones said, or that Jones intended to enlist the 
help of his supporters to further a conspiracy to kill Ryan. It is 
also quite possible that the conspiracy to kill Ryan arose without 
the influence of Jones. Here, it is not clear when the conspiracy 
to kill Ryan arose, and evidence to link the defendant to a plan 
which also included Jones is not substantial. 
Another problem with this aspect of the opInion is the 
court's reliance on the hearsay statements themselves to suggest 
there was a "reasonable inference" to support a single conspir-
acy theory. Such reliance is clearly prohibited by Perez and the 
federal rules which require independent proof of the existence of 
a conspiracy. Lower courts in future conspiracy cases should be 
cautious in finding inferences of conspiracy when independent 
facts to support such a finding are not present. 
A particularly troublesome aspect of the court's analysis is 
the ruling that the statements made by Jones to his attorney not 
only qualified as declarations against penal interest, but also 
could be offered as evidence to inculpate the defendant. In so 
ruling, the court stretches the penal interest hearsay exception 
beyond its traditional bounds.l12 The initial difficulty is the 
court finding the statements were inculpative in light of their 
content. The remarks did not inculpate Jones nor did they indi-
cate that he was responsible for the imminent violence at the 
airstrip. Instead, the statements were directed toward the defen-
dant's alleged role in the events which later took Ryan's life. It 
would seem likely that Jones would inform a trusted person, in 
this case his attorney, that someone else intended to kill Ryan in 
order not to implicate himself in any wrongdoing. In light of the 
fact that the statements were not entirely accurate, and since 
111. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 53 and 54 for the language of Rule 804(b)(3) and comments 
regarding its application. 
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the defendant cannot impeach an unavailable witness, the 
court's decision undermines the concern that evidence under 
this hearsay exception be trustworthy. 
A second problem with the ruling in Layton is the danger-
ous precedent which the court establishes. The court fails to 
mention that in the circuit cases relied on for authority, the 
statements were excluded in whole or in part because they were 
not trustworthy. While it can be recognized that there may be 
instances which might provide a valid argument for the admis-
sion of inculpative statements under the penal interest exception 
to the hearsay rule, the facts in Layton do not lend themselves 
to set a trend for the lower courts. 
Finally, in permitting the admission of the three groups of 
hearsay statements notwithstanding the provisions of the con-
frontation clause, the court limits sixth amendment protections 
and ignores the Supreme Court decisions1l3 which focus on 
cross-examination as the touchstone of the confrontation issue. 
In Layton, the court ruled that the contested hearsay state-
ments could be admitted under the reliability analysis suggested 
in Dutton. The difficulty with that approach is perhaps best il-
lustrated by the fact that Dutton was a plurality opinion which 
did not clearly address the sixth amendment issues. Therefore, 
its precedential value is questionable. 
While relying on Dutton, the Ninth Circuit ignored the lan-
guage in that case as well as its earlier holding in Perez when it 
failed to address the confrontation issue1l4 respecting the co-
conspirator statements. As Perez required that the record be re-
viewed for constitutional infirmity, lUi the Supreme Court in 
Dutton made it clear that it must be demonstrated that admis-
sion of the statement will not violate the confrontation clause. 
The explanation for the court's failure to consider that issue 
may lie in the lower court's failure to consider the issue. How-
ever, that explanation is insufficient given the fact that the lower 
court excluded the evidence on other grounds and had no reason 
to address the confrontation issue. Since admission of the taped 
speeches is critical in finding a conspiracy to which Jones and 
113. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See supra notes 64 and 66. 
114. 720 F.2d at 558. 
115. 658 F.2d at 660. 
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the defendant were connected, the court should have addressed 
the issue to determine whether the provisions of the sixth 
amendment were satisfied. 
In relying on the plurality OpInIOn in Dutton, the court 
completely ignores the Supreme Court's previous holdings1l6 
which dealt with the confrontation issue. Significantly, the court 
fails to consider Pointer and Bruton in its analysis. These are 
cases which fall into a line of authority that reveal the approach 
relied on by the Court in deciding cases arising under the con-
frontation clause. The approach focuses on cross-examination as 
a requirement for confrontation.1l7 Such a focus is appropriate 
given the critical nature of the facts in Layton. 
The Dutton case involved the confrontation of a witness 
testifying to non-critical statements of the declarant. An abun-
dance of independent evidence was available to the prosecution 
to help obtain a conviction in that case. The Ninth Circuit's reli-
ance on the case is an unwise expansion of a dubious plurality 
approach. The evidence in question in Layton is critical to the 
case and the degree of independent evidence to connect Jones 
and Layton to the same conspiracy is certainly questionable. 
Equally significant is the actual content of the hearsay 
statements at issue in the Layton case. Since they are critical in 
determining the intent of the declarant Jim Jones, his state of 
mind at the time he made the speeches and the remarks to his 
attorney is particularly relevant. Again, Dutton affords little 
help on this point. In that case the state of mind of the declar-
ant proved to be insignificant. Further, the defendant was at 
least able to avail himself of the opportunity to cross-examine 
the witness testifying to the statement alleged to inculpate him. 
Under those circumstances the jury was at least able to reach a 
conclusion as to the weight to be given the testimony of the wit-
ness, a prison informant, in light of the considerable evidence 
which had been offered by the prosecution. 
The facts in Layton support a "cross-examination" analysis 
of the confrontation issue as set forth in Pointer and Bruton. To 
116. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See supra notes 64 and 66. 
117. See text accompanying note 67. 
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suggest that there is sufficient independent evidence to justify 
the admission of the statements without raising a confrontation 
problem simply is not supported by the facts of the case. The 
court's suggestion that Jones' state of mind at the time he made 
the speeches will be obvious from the recordings themselves is 
an untenable proposition. While the arguments for admitting 
the various statements under exceptions to the hearsay rule is 
readily apparent, the confrontation problems which are inherent 
in this case do not favor the admission of the tape recorded 
statements offered against the defendant. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The events which took place at the airstrip near Jonestown, 
Guyana in 1978 are ineligbly stamped into the minds of many. 
These events indicate there was some evidence pointing to a 
conspiracy to kill Congressman Leo Ryan. However, evidence of 
when that conspiracy arose and the actors involved is unclear. 
The Ninth Circuit's opinion demonstrates the court's will-
ingness to ensure that there is accountability for the murder. 
However, the opinion is dangerous because it provides a stan-
dard by which established rules of evidence and appellate proce-
dure are stretched to their limits. This precedent could lead to 
convictions based on inculpatory statements absent confronta-
tion of the declarant and may result in the admission of less 
than reliable evidence in criminal trials. The court in effect ex-
tends prosecutorial boundaries in its broad interpretation of the 
appeals statute and the applicable rules of evidence. The cursory 
analysis of the confrontation clause question reflects a limitation 
on the assertion of sixth amendment protections. 
Samuel Santistevan· 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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u.s. v. RUBIO: NINTH CIRCUIT SETS HIGH 
STANDARD OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 
SEARCH WARRANTS UNDER RICO 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Rubio,l the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that in the absence of a showing by the government 
that an association is wholly unlawful, the affidavit supporting 
the warrant to search the premises of that organization must 
provide probable cause to believe the people associated with the 
organization had conducted its affairs through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity.2 
Defendant Manuel Frank Rubio was convicted of violating 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, more 
commonly referred to as RICO,s for conspiring to participate in 
the conduct of the affairs of the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club. 
On June 13, 1979 a grand jury returned a three count indictment 
charging thirty-three defendants with various violations of the 
RICO statute.· Rubio was one of the named defendants.1I 
. Searches of defendant's premises had been made pursuant 
to indicia warrants under RICO which authorized the search and 
seizure of articles showing membership in, or association with, 
an enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. 
Through the use of indicia warrants, authorities not only found 
evidence of membership and association with the Hell's Angels, 
1. 727 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Anderson, J; Takasugi, District J. sitting by 
designation; Poole, J. dissenting) 
2. [d. at 794. 
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. (1976). 
4. The grand jury had determined that the Hell's Angels Motocycle Club was an 
enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity and therefore in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1961(a), (c) and (d), 727 F.2d at 790. 
5: There were five other defendants (Elledge, Smith, Palomar, Passaro and Stefan-
son) who appealed their convictions of various firearms and narcotics violations. Rubio 
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but were also able to seize substantial amounts of evidence of 
criminal activity not covered by the indictment.6 
At trial, the court concluded that the indicia warrants were 
valid under the fourth amendment, because a nexus existed be-
tween the items sought and the alleged criminal activity.' Defen-
dants appealed and contended that there was no such nexus.6 
II. BACKGROUND 
RICO was enacted for the purpose of protecting legitimate 
business from the infiltration of organized crime.9 RICO's four 
6. [d. 
7. [d. at 793. 
8. [d. at 792. Part III of the majority opinion dealt with various issues raised by 
defendant Smith. Because he had consented to a search of his premises and firearms 
were found in plain view, the court found all of his objections to be without merit. His 
conviction was affirmed. [d. at 799. 
9. Section 1 of Act (Oct. 15, 1970, P.L. 91-452, Title IX, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941; Nov. 
2, 1978, P.L. 95-575, § 3(c), 92 Stat. 2465); provided: 
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United 
States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread 
activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's 
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, 
fraud and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major por-
tion of its power through money obtained from such illegal en-
deavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and 
fencing of property, the importation and distribution of nar-
cotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social 
exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used 
to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions 
and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) or-
ganized crime activities in the United States weaken the sta-
bility of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent inves-
tors and competing organizations, interfere with free 
competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign com-
merce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the gen-
eral welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized 
crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence 
gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the 
legally admissable evidence necessary to bring criminal and 
other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities 
of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions 
and remedies available to the government are unnecessarily 
limited in scope and impact. 
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of or-
ganized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal 
tools in the evidence gathering process, by establishing new 
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and 
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those en-
22
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criminal prohibitions are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1962. The Sec-
tion prohibits: (1) the acquisition of legitimate business with il-
legally derived funds;lo (2) any person from illegally acquiring, 
maintaining an interest in or controlling any enterprise affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce;ll (3) provides that any employee 
or any person associated with an enterprise who conducts or 
participates in illegal conduct of the enterprise such as racke-
teering or collection of an unlawful debtl2 has violated this sec-
tion;13 and (4) declares that it is illegal for any person to con-
spire to violate any of the provisions stated above.14 
To obtain a conviction under RICO the government must 
prove that an enterprise exists and that it was engaged in a pat-
tern of racketeering activity. I II An enterprise includes an individ-
ual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity 
and any union or group of individuals associated for an illegal 
purpose. IS A pattern of racketeering activity requires at least 
gaged in organized crime. 
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) provides in part that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any 
income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racke-
teering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt. . . 
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such in-
come, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enter-
prise which engages in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce. 
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any person through a 
pattern of racketeering activity or through col1ection of an unlawful debt to acquire or 
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976) defines "unlawful debt" as a debt "(A) incurred or 
contracted in gambling activity ... and (B) ... incurred in connection with the busi-
ness of gambling activity in violation of the law ... " 
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associ-
ated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which 
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection 
of unlawful debt. 
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any person to con-
spire to violate any of the provisions of subsections(a), (b), or (c) of this section." 
15. U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). 
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976) defines "enterprise" to include "any individual, part-
nership, corporation, association, or other legal entity and any union or group of individ-
uals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 
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two acts of racketeering activity within a ten year period. 17 
In United States v. Turkette,I8 the Supreme Court held 
that the term enterprise as used in RICO encompasses both le-
gitimate and illegitimate organizations. IS In Turkette, defen-
dant20 formed an association for the purpose of illegally traffick-
ing in narcotics, committing arsons, defrauding insurance 
companies, bribing and attempting to bribe local police officers 
and attempting to influence the outcome of state court proceed-
ings.21 On appeal the defendant argued that RICO was only in-
tended to protect legitimate business from infiltration by organ-
ized crime and that RICO did not encompass organizations 
which only performed illegal acts when they had made no at-
tempt to infiltrate legitimate business.22 The First Circuit 
agreed;23but was reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court 
stated that RICO should be interpreted to cover both legitimate 
and illegitimate enterprises24 and found nothing in the statute's 
legislative history requiring a different conclusion.211 
RICO has been challenged on many grounds. The First 
Amendment guarantee of free association recognized by the Su-
preme Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson28 and 
Bates v.' City of Little Rock,27 is one such challenge. In both 
cases the Supreme Court held that compelled disclosure of 
membership in an organization absent sufficient justification, vi-
olated the constitutional guarantees of privacy in group associa-
tion and freedom of association.28 
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) states: "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least 
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this 
chapter [enacted October 15, 1970) and the last of which occurred within ten years (ex-
cluding any period of imprisonment) of the commission of a prior act of racketeering 
activity. " 
18. 452 U.S. at 576. 
19. [d. at 580-81. 
20. Defendant Turkette was convicted after a six week trial on the RICO conspiracy 
count, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and was sentenced to a 20 year term and fined $20,000. [d. at 
579. 
21. [d. 
22. [d. at 579-80. 
23. 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1981). 
24. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580. 
25. [d. at 591. 
26. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
27. 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
28. 357 U.S. at 462; 361 U.S. at 523. The Court stated: "In the domain of these 
24
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In another constitutional challenge, in United States u. 
Giese/·9 it was alleged that admission of certain evidence in-
fringed first amendment liberties of freedom of expression and 
the right to receive information.30 The Ninth Circuit rejected 
this argument, however, and held that although evidence of as-
sociation may not establish a conspiracy it has sufficient proba-
tive value to be admissable.31 
Similarly, in United States u. Martino,32 a group who asso-
ciated for the purpose of committing arson with the intent to 
defraud fire insurers was convicted under RICO.33 On appeal de-
fendants alleged that RICO was unconstitutional because it pun-
ished associational status. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment and stated that RICO's prescriptions are directed against 
conduct, not status.34 
RICO has also been challenged on fourth and fourteenth 
amendment grounds. In Zurcher u. Stanford Daily,31i the Ninth 
Circuit held that the fourth and fourteenth amendments forbade 
the issuance of a warrant to search for materials in possession of 
one not suspected of crime unless the affidavit supporting the 
warrant gave probable cause to believe that a subpoena duces 
tecum would be impracticable.3e The Supreme Court however, 
rejected this test and reversed stating that the critical element 
was not whose possession was involved but whether there was 
reasonable cause to believe that the things to be seized might be 
indispensible liberties, whether of speech, press or association, the decisions of this Court 
recognize that the abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably 
follow from varied forms of governmental action. 357 U.S. at 461. Therefore, the court 
held "that the immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association 
[NAACP) claims on behalf of its members to pursue their lawful private interests pri-
vately and to associate freely with others in so doing [comes) within the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 466. 
29. 597 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979). 
30. 597 F.2d at 1185. In that case defendant was associated with an anti-war group 
responsible for several bombings of United States Armed Forces Recruiting Centers. To 
show association the government introduced a book entitled From the Movement To-
ward Revolution on which were found Giese's fingerprints and those of several other 
defendants. Id. 
31. Id. at 1187. 
32. 648 F.2d 367, (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 943 (1982). 
33. 648 F.2d at 379. 
34. Id. at 380. 
35. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
36. 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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found on the searched premises.37 The Court then held that a 
search warrant may issue for items in the possession of a third 
party who is not suspected of a crime.38 
The fourth amendment requires that no warrants shall issue 
except upon a showing of probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation. Prior to 1967 mere evidence, which is evidence 
seized for the purpose of proving the government's case, was in-
admissable at trial. Under the reasoning of Gouled u. United 
States,39 the fourth amendment only allowed the seizure of in-
strumentalities, fruits of crime or contraband.40 
In Warden u. Hayden,41 the Court reversed this long stand-
ing rule and stated that nothing in the language of the fourth 
amendment supported the distinction between mere evidence 
and instrumentalities, fruits of crime or contraband.42 The Su-
preme Court reasoned that privacy is not disturbed any more by 
a search directed to a purely evidentiary object than it is by a 
search directed to an instrumentality, fruit or contraband!3 Be-
cause a magistrate can intervene in both situations, the fourth 
amendment requirements of probable cause and specificity are 
not threatened. The Court went on to conclude that there must 
be a nexus between the item to be seized and criminal behav-
ior." In the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband, the 
nexus is automatically provided. In the case of mere evidence, 
probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe 
that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or 
conviction.411 
In Illinois u. Gates,46 the Supreme Court changed the appel-
late standard for reviewing magistrates' findings of probable 
cause with respect to anonymous informants' tips and imple-
37. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565. 
38. [d. 
39. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
40. [d. at 310-11. (Papers seized only for evidentiary value not specifically described 
on the warrant affidavit were held to be taken in violation of defendant's fourth amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.) [d. at 311. 
41. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
42. [d. at 301-02. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 307. 
45. [d. 
46. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). 
26
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mented a new probable cause standard.·7 The court held that 
although veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are all 
highly relevant in evaluating an informant's tip, these elements 
are not dispositive. Rather, they should be viewed as intertwined 
issues which may illuminate whether there was probable cause 
to believe that contraband or evidence was located in a particu-
lar place.48 The Court noted that so long as the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding that a search warrant would un-
cover evidence of wrongdoing, the appellate court may only re-
verse if it can find no substantial basis for the magistrate's 
decision.49 
In United States v. Brooklier,IIO defendants were convicted 
of violating RICO and the Hobbs Act.1I1 Defendants were mem-
bers of La Cosa Nostra, a secret national organization engaged 
in a wide range of racketeering activities.1I2 Defendants claimed 
47. Id. at 2325. 
48. Id. Justice Rehnquist labelled this approach the totality of the circumstances 
test. Id. at 2328. 
49. Id. at 2332. Prior to Gates the Ninth Circuit had held that it was a question of 
law for the appellate court to determine whether probable cause existed at the time the 
magistrate issued the indicia warrant. United States u. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353, 1359 
(1982); however, in the Rubio case it is not clear whether or not the court has adopted 
the Gates standard: "The Supreme Court in Gates applied a standard that would con-
sider whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for his probable cause determina-
tion .... For purposes of this case, however, we are constrained to disagree with the 
trial court regardless of which standard [Chesher (de nouo review) or Gates (substantial 
basis)] applies." 727 F.2d at 793. The majority noted that the issue was currently before 
the court in United States u. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). The narrow issue 
in that case was: what standard of review should the appellate court apply when a fed-
eral agent performs an improper search but was excused by exigent circumstances? The 
court held that "the question of exigent circumstances is subject to de nouo review." Id. 
at 1205. The court noted that "[q)uestions of fact are reviewed under the deferential, 
clearly erroneous standard." Id. at 1200. Under the court's ad hoc approach "a number 
of categories of suppression questions [will be] open to review under standards that will 
have to be developed for each of the categories by the seperate weighing of the prepon-
derance of facts or law in so-called mixed questions of law and fact." Id. at 1209. The 
court did not discuss the applicability of Gates. 
50. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 19'82). 
51. Id. at 1213. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1948) provides that: 
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects 
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in 
commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires to 
do so or commits or threatens physical violence to any person 
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything 
in violation of this section shall be fined not more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years or both. 
52. The court stated La Cosa Nostra was responsible for acts of murder, extortion, 
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that the indictment charging them with a RICO conspiracy was 
fatally ambiguous. liS The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument 
and stated that the essence of a RICO conspiracy is not an 
agreement to commit racketeering acts, but an agreement to 
conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering. 1I4 The court reasoned that conspiracies 
or attempts can serve as racketeering activities because 18 
U.S.C. § 1951 is applicable to conspiracies and attempts to ob-
struct, delay or impact commerce by robbery, extortion or physi-
cal violence.lIlI Therefore, even if a racketeering offense was not 
completed, defendants had violated RICO.lIe 
The Second Circuit affirmed two RICO convictions in 
United States v. ScottO.1I7 Defendants alleged that the trial 
judge should have instructed the jury that they were required to 
find that the acts committed by them concerned or related to 
the operation of a particular enterprise and its affairs through 
its essential functions. liB The appellate court rejected this argu-
ment and stated that RICO requires only that the government 
prove that the defendants' acts were committed in the conduct 
of the union's affairs.1I9 This burden could be fulfilled by showing 
either (1) that one is enabled to commit RICO violations solely 
by virtue of a position in the enterprise or involvement in or 
control over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) by showing that 
the violations were related to the activities of that enterprise.eo 
gambling and loan sharking. 685 F.2d at 1213. 
53. 1d. at 1216. Defendants alleged that the racketeering activities set forth in 




56. 1d., See supra notes 10-14. 
57. 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980). 
58. 1d. at 54. Defendants were president and vice-president of the Local 1814 of the 
International Longshoreman's Union. 1d. at 50. 
59. [d. at 54. 
60. 1d. Since the government fulfilled its burden of proof on both counts appellant's 
argument was dismissed. The Second Circuit also quoted the following language: 
Section 1962(c) nowhere requires proof regarding the ad-
vancement of the union's affairs by the defendant's activities, 
or proof that the union itself is corrupt, or proof that the 
union authorized defendant to do whatever acts form the basis 
for the charge. It requires only that the government establish 
that the defendant's acta were committed in the conduct of 
the union's affairs. 
1d., quoting United States v. Field, 432 F.Supp. 55, 58 (S.D. N.Y. 1977), aft'd, 578 F.2d 
28
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/8
1985] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 141 
Finally, RICO has been challenged on the issue of whether a 
grand jury indictment is sufficient to establish probable cause to 
search. In United States u. Ellsworth,S1 defendant claimed that 
the affidavits supporting the search warrant did not set forth 
facts that would lead a neutral and detached magistrate to con-
clude that probable cause existed to believe that he had commit-
ted an assault.62 The Ninth Circuit disagreed,S3 stating that 
sworn affidavits by eye witnesses describing Ellsworth and his 
clothing coupled with an indictment, supported the magistrate's 
finding of probable cause.s• The Ninth Circuit noted that the 
magistrate has the same right as the court to take judicial notice 
of the indictment.sli However, the Ninth Circuit stated that it 
was not persuaded by the government's argument that a magis-
trate can base a probable cause decision to search solely on a 
previous indictment. ss It reasoned that because a grand jury's 
spectrum of responsibility does not include the duty of deter-
mining probable cause to search, an indictment alone would not 
constitute sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant.S7 
III. ANAL YSIS 
A. The Majority 
The court first determined whether the search for items 
containing the identities of Hell's Angels members, other than 
those indicted, violated the right to freedom of association.s8 An-
swering in the negative the court reasoned that although there is 
a potential for abuse in using an indicia warrant, a narrowly 
drawn and properly issued and executed warrant does not vio-
1371 (2d Cir. 1978),cert.denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). 
61. 647 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1981). 
62. Id. at 963. 
63. Id. at 964. 
64.Id. 
65. Id. at 963. See United States v. Sevier, 539 F.2d 599,603 (6th Cir. 1976). 
66. Id. at 964. 
67. Id., In general the Ninth Circuit has given prosecutors broad leeway in filing 
RICO complaints. 
See United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877(9th Cir. 1981). In prosecution for 
RICO violation, government is not precluded from using same evidence to establish both 
element of enterprise and element of pattern of racketeering; see United States v. Brook-
lier, 685 F.2d at 1220-22. In prosecution for violating RICO, uncorroborated testimony of 
accomplice is sufficient to support convictions so long as it is not incredible or unsub-
stantial on its face. See United States v. Sigal, 572 F.2d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 1978). 
68. 727 F.2d at 791. 
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late a RICO suspect's first amendment rights.69 The rights are 
protected because the government is required to prove both that 
the suspect was associated with an organization and that the or-
ganization was engaged in racketeering.70 
The Ninth Circuit agreed, however, with defendant's argu-
ment challenging the issuance of the warrants for lack of proba-
ble cause. The court stated that no nexus was established by the 
government between the evidence seized and criminal activity.71 
All of the items described in the search warrants were to be used 
as evidence, by the government, to show association with a 
RICO enterprise. Therefore, the court applied a two-part test. 
First, the warrants were examined to determine whether there 
was probable cause to believe a suspect was associated with a 
particular enterprise. Next, the court held that absent a showing 
that a large portion of a RICO enterprise's activities are illegiti-
mate so that the entire enterprise, in effect, becomes wholly ille-
gitimate, the warrants must be examined for probable cause to 
believe that the suspect conducted the affairs of the enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering activity.72 
In applying its two-part standard to the search warrants 
and their supporting affidavits in this case, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the warrants were issued without probable 
cause.73 Because none of the affidavits contained statements or 
69. [d. at 792. 
70. [d. The court stated: 
"We agree with defendants that the First Amendment protects their right to associ-
ate with one another and with the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club. We strongly disagree 
with any inference that criminal investigation is somehow prohibited when it interferes 
with such First Amendment interests." 
[d. at 791. 
71. [d. at 794. 
72. [d. The court stated: "probable cause to believe a suspect was associated with a 
particular enterprise would be insufficient of itself to support a warrant for the seizure of 
indicia of association." [d. Therefore it held that unless the enterprise can be shown to 
be "wholly illegitimate" the government must prove the suspect conducted the affairs of 
the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. The court went on to state: 
"We believe a contrary rule could lead to the seizure of 'mere evidence' from any sus-
pected member or associate of any enterprise with no nexus whatever between the evi-
dence and criminal activity." [d. The court implied that such a rule would violate the 
fourth amendment. 
73. [d. at 794. The affidavit in part cited (1) forms of indicia customarily kept by 
members and associates of the Hell's Angels; (2)facts tending to establish that each de-
fendant was a member or associate of the Hell's Angels; and (3) that a federal grand jury 
had returned an indictment which charged the named defendants with associating with a 
30
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facts to believe that defendant had conducted the affairs of the 
motorcycle club through a pattern of racketeering activity there 
was no probable cause.74 Additionally, since the facts stated in 
the affidavits were limited to establishment of association with 
the club, they were insufficient to provide the required nexus be-
tween defendant's association with the club and criminal 
activity.711 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the trial court's holding 
that because evidence of association would aid in a conviction 
under the RICO counts, a nexus existed between the items 
sought and the alleged criminal activity.76 Because the affidavit 
did not allege that the motorcycle club's activities were wholly 
illegitimate, it did not follow that evidence of association would 
necessarily aid in obtaining a conviction. The court reasoned 
that if the affidavit supporting the search warrant failed to show 
that an organization was wholly illegitimate, those people inno-
cently associated with a legitimate enterprise being conducted 
by others through a pattern of racketeering activity would for-
feit their fourth amendment protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.77 
The court then stated that an affidavit's recitation of a 
RICO indictment handed down by a grand jury was insufficient 
to establish probable cause.7S It reasoned that only a neutral and 
detached magistrate can properly make the determination of 
probable cause to search." Furthermore, the basis of the magis-
trate's probable cause determination must show from the face of 
the warrant affidavit. so Since making determinations of probable 
cause is beyond the scope of the grand jury's duties as set forth 
in Ellsworth, an indictment alone cannot provide probable cause 
to search.81 
RICO enterprise. [d. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. at 793. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. at 794. 
79. [d. at 794-95., See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981). 
80. See United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1978). 
81. 727 F.2d at 795. (the function of the grand jury is to determine whether there is 
sufficient probable cause to require an accused to stand trial before a petit jury). 
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The majority also stated the affidavit gave no basis for be-
lieving that defendant had conducted the affairs of a RICO en-
terprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Therefore, 
the magistrate had no substantial basis for concluding that 
probable cause existed82 because the magistrate's probable cause 
determination was no more than a ratification of the conclusions 
of a grand jury. Citing Ellsworth, the court noted that this was 
an impermissable basis.83 Furthermore, because fourth amend-
ment privacy protection is highly vulnerable when evidence of 
association with a RICO enterprise is sought, the affidavit sup-
porting the search warrant most show both probable cause to 
believe that the suspect was associated with a particular enter-
prise and that the suspect conducted its affairs by means of 
racketeering.8• The court concluded that the affidavits did not 
provide probable cause and the evidence discovered through the 
search warrants should have been suppressed.811 
B. The Dissent 
The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that 
under RICO if a defendent is charged with associating with an 
enterprise and participating in the conduct of its affairs through 
a pattern of racketeering, a warrant cannot issue to search out 
indicia of association unless the affidavits allege that the enter-
prise is wholly illega1.88 
It rejected the majority's interpretation of Warden v. Hay-
den, and argued that when evidence is sought by the govern-
ment solely to prove its case at trial, probable cause should be 
evaluated on the basis of whether or not the evidence sought will 
aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.87 Although such 
evidence does not prove that a suspect is guilty, it can be used to 
constitute a link in an evidentiary chain supporting a reasonable 
belief that a certain suspect may have committed a particular 
crime.88 




86. [d. at 800. 
87. [d. at 803. 
88. 727 F.2d at 803. 
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The dissent also argued that the majority's two-part proba-
ble cause standard was based on two faulty premises.89 First, if 
the crime involved association, the affidavit must charge that the 
organization was wholly illegal. Second, the affidavit cannot be 
saved by references to an indictment because an indictment does 
not give probable cause to search.90 The dissent stated that with 
respect to the first premise, the fourth amendment makes no re-
quirement that a suspect's conduct or association be "wholly il-
legal" and furthermore that the criminal process is not equipped 
to make such judgments.91 Next, considering the validity of the 
affidavits, the dissent concluded that the majority had erred in 
rejecting them.92 It argued that because the affidavits described 
conduct which amounted to racketeering activity outlined in 
RICO, and they set forth the basis of the affiant's knowledge, 
the indictment did not stand alone as the basis for the magis-
trate's finding of probable cause.9S 
The dissent next addressed the issue of whether an indict-
ment constitutes probable cause to issue a search warrant. It dis-
agreed with the majority's interpretation of Ellsworth and ar-
gued that because the magistrate was permitted to take judicial 
notice of the indictment there was no reason to bar it from 
consideration.94 
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's stance on ex-




91. Id. at 804. The dissent stated: 
92. [d. 
The Fourth Amendment requires specificity as to persons, 
houses, papers and effects; and these requirements must be 
made known to a judicial officer by oath or affirmation. Sel-
dom can it be demonstrated that the ... prosecution is for 
conduct wholly bad. That is a moral not a legal judgment, and 
it is with the latter that the criminal process is equipped to 
deal. 
93. Id. at 805. 
94. Id. The dissent distinguished Ellsworth on two grounds: first, it was not a RICO 
case, and second, the search warrant was upheld because the indictment was supported 
by eye-witness testimony. Id. at 804-05. In conclusion he stated: "The majority has over-
stated the opinion of Ellsworth and understated the probable cause significance of a 
valid indictment." Id. at 805. 
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cause. 911 It stated that Gates did apply to this case and that it 
was dispositive.96 Under Gates the magistrate's job in determin-
ing probable cause for a search warrant consisted of making a 
practical, commonsense decision whether given all the circum-
stances set forth in the affidavit there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place.97 The dissent stated that on this basis the district court 
was correct in handing a conviction of defendant.98 Since the 
duty of the appellate court under Gates is simply to ensure that 
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that proba-
ble cause existed,99 the dissent stated that the majority's holding 
was not mandated by the Fourth Amendment, did not comport 
with current precedent and did not serve the sound administra-
tion of justice.loo 
IV. CRITIQUE 
By implementing its two-part association-conduct probable 
cause requirement for search warrants for legitimate and semi-
legitimate RICO enterprises the majority opinion vindicates the 
fourth amendment right to privacy and the first amendment 
right of freedom of association. However, the majority's new test 
raises many uncertainties because of the difficulty in demon-
strating that an organization's affairs are wholly illegitimate. 
Law enforcement will now be required to prove association and 
illegal conduct with reasonable certainty to the magistrate 
before it is legally permitted to gather evidence. Additionally, 
since grand jury indictments were held to be insufficient to give 
probable cause to search,lol law enforcement authorities must 
now show that the very persons whose premises were to be 
searched had themselves conducted the affairs of an enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering activity. 
The dissent criticized the majority on the ground that it is 
not the function of an affidavit to contain plenary allegations as 
95. [d. at 808. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. See 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). 
98. 727 F.2d at 808-09. 
99. [d. at 808. 
100. [d. at 809. 
101. [d. at 795. 
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is the case in an indictment or information.l02 It stated that the 
function of the affidavit is simply to show that probable cause 
exists to believe that particular evidence used in a described 
crime could probably be found in a certain location and that 
that evidence could aid iIi convicting the suspect. l03 If the magis-
trate has this information he should issue the search warrant. 
Under this reasoning, the majority's rule appears to be incorrect 
because it adds unnecessary technicality to the warrant require-
ment. Also, by restricting the application of search warrants to 
only people who have conducted the affairs of an enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering, the rule impedes the ability of 
law enforcement authorities to combat organized crime. 
In light of the Gates totality of the circumstances test for 
determining probable cause, the majority's standard does not 
appear to be sound.l04 The Supreme Court chose to replace the 
reliability of informant-basis of knowledge test developed by the 
appellate courts with a more pragmatic totality of the circum-
stances test. 1011 The rationale for this test is that it is difficult to 
square the complex evidentiary rules developed by appellate 
courts with common sense judgments of magistrates, who apply 
standards less demanding than those used in formal legal pro-
ceedings. Furthermore, since the fourth amendment imposes a 
strong preference for search warrants, courts should interpret af-
fidavits in a common sense rather than a hypertechnical ma~ner. 
Most important for the Court was the argument that the basic 
function of any government is to provide for the security of the 
individual and his property.lOe The Court stated that reversing 
convictions because of technical flaws in a search warrant will 
seriously impede the task of law enforcement. l07 The majority 
failed to even consider this reasoning before developing its own 
standard of probable cause.l08 
102. Id. at 804. 
103. [d. 
104. See supra note 49. 
105. 103 S.Ct. at 2331. 
106. [d. 
107. Id. 
108. The dissent stated: "In reality, the majority's rationale simply is a construct 
harking back to the comforting impedimentia of Aguilar and Spinelli and which accom-
modates a patent unease with the directions of Warden and the explicit holding of 
Gates." 727 F.2d at 803. 
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The majority's concern that search warrants issued under 
RICO could threaten constitutional rights may be traced to the 
increased breadth of RICO in the past few years. IOe Although the 
original purpose of RICO was to protect legitimate business 
from the infiltration of organized crime,l1O it has been used in an 
increasing number of circumstances. lll One reason for this may 
be that a RICO enterprise has been construed by courts to en-
compass many different combinations of individuals or groups of 
individuals.112 The issue of what constitutes a RICO enterprise 
has become particularly acute because Congress did not draft 
RICO to encompass illegal enterprises. Since the statute does 
not distinguish legal from illegal enterprises, courts have been 
forced to determine the outlines of the illegal enterprise con-
cept1l8 without any guidance from the statute's legislative 
history. 
In this context, the Ninth Circuit's two-part probable cause 
standard can be viewed as a means of cutting back on RICO's 
109. Congress seems to have invited broad judicial interpretations by stating that 
RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes," Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91·452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947. 
110. See supra note 9. 
111. See United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) (RICO 
used against a Japanese corporation manufacturing electric cable). In United States v. 
Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977) (RICO used against constables and employees of 
the Allegheny County court system). 
112. See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 
(1978), where the court held that any informal, loosely organized, de facto association 
engaged in criminal conduct could constitute a RICO enterprise; because the definition 
of enterprise is so amorphous, it has been argued that the government need only estab· 
lish a pattern or racketeering activity to obtain a conviction. See Tarlow, RICO: The 
New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L.REV. 165, 202 (1980). 
113. In Turkette the Supreme Court described a RICO enterprise as "a group of 
persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct" 
and "an ongoing organization, formal or informal [in which) the various associates func· 
tion as a continuing unit." 452 U.S. at 583. In United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996 (4th 
Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982) the court held that an illegal enterprise 
must have separate existence. Id. at 999; In United States v. De Rosa, 670 F.2d 889, 896 
(9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit held that under Turkette association by defendants 
over a long period of time and involvement in drug distribution constituted an illegal 
enterprise. For other approaches see United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 
1980); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982) (court required proof by the 
government of three factors: (1) commonality of purpose; (2) continuity of both structure 
and personality and (3) an ascertainable structure distinct from racketeering activity). 
Id. at 665. For critique of Bledsoe see Note, United States v. Bledsoe: RICO· Limiting 
The Enterprise, 16 CREIGHTON L.REV. 1006 (1983); for an excellent survey of cases con· 
struing RICO after Turkette see Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 293, 324·40 
(1983). 
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breadth and of side-stepping the enterprise issue. However, the 
problem of what constitutes a RICO enterprise still exists and 
the court should have addressed the issue. By adding the wholly 
illegitimate enterprise test the court adds another layer of com-
plexity to the statute's interpretation. Since the court failed to 
define illegal enterprise their test creates unnecessary confusion. 
Because this issue was not resolved the viability of RICO prose-
cutions will become unpredictable and lower courts will be bur-
dened with unworkable standards. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The majority's decision will have a direct and adverse pub-
lic impact. After a long and difficult trial114 five out of six convic-
tions were reversed because the affidavits to the warrants did 
not measure up to the majority's standard of probable cause. 
Since the evidence obtained through the search warrants was 
suppressed, the prosecution will probably have to drop the case. 
This results in frustration to law enforcement agencies and the 
public pays for high investigation and court costs and no results. 
This opinion will impair the use of RICO against organized 
crime since the majority has failed to articulate a standard for 
what constitutes a wholly illegal enterprise. Moreover, the 
court's probable cause test is over-technical and will result in 
less successful criminal RICO prosecutions against organized 
crime. 
Douglas Buchanan* 
114. 727 F.2d at 800. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, class of 1986. 
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